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THE RIGHT TO EDUCATE THE ROLE OF THE PARENT,
THE CHURCH AND THE STATE
JOSEPH T. TINNELLY, C.M.*

S

the attention of the nation has been
focused, as never before, upon the education of our children. In
books, periodicals, newspapers and public addresses, responsible critics
have deplored the poor quality of many of our educational products and
have challenged the soundness of many current philosophies of education.
The next few years will witness a profound re-examination of our
entire educational system. Objectives must be reconsidered, methods
evaluated, materials scrutinized, standards weighed, curricula reorganized, faculty salary scales adjusted, recruitment of teachers intensified,
teacher training improved. The task is staggering and the cooperation of
all concerned will be needed: parents, teachers, administrators, school
boards, departments of education, state legislatures, the federal government, churches, civic groups, educational foundations, everyone
having an interest in education and an ability to contribute toward its
improvement.
Inevitably there will be conflicts of interest. Inevitably there will be
disagreements as to goals and methods. Therefore it is essential that the
principles and policies upon which America must rebuild its educational
structure be clearly delineated.
Presuming, of course, that all are concerned with the welfare of the
child, the three principal parties in interest in any educational plan are
the parents, the Church, and the State. All of them have rights but in
no case are these rights absolute. And so the first task is to determine
what are the respective rights of the parents, the Church and the State.
INCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II

Right of Parents to Educate
The right of parents to educate stems from their duty to the child. In
the words of Pope Pius XI,
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• . . no one can fail to see that children are
incapable of providing wholly for themselves, even in matters pertaining to their
natural life, and much less in those pertaining to the supernatural, but require for
many years to be helped, instructed, and
educated by others. Now it is certain that
both by the law of nature and of God this
right and duty of educating their offspring
belongs in the first place to those who began
the work of nature by giving them birth,
and they are indeed forbidden to leave unfinished this work and so expose it to certain
ruin.'
Natural and divine love make easy and
even attractive for the normal mother and
father this duty to educate their children.
Nevertheless the Church spells out this duty
in its canon law which in this respect is
merely a partial codification of natural and
divine law; "The primary end of marriage,"
says Section 7 of Canon 1013, "is the procreation and education of children."
More specifically, Canon 1113 warns
that "Parents are bound by the gravest of
obligations to secure by all means in their
power the religious, moral, physical, and
civil education of their children, as well as
to provide for their temporal welfare."
The duty of parents to educate their
children is recognized and enforced by the
civil law as well. The education law of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for instance, provides that:
Every parent, guardian, or other person
having control or charge of any child or
children of compulsory school age is required to send such child or children to a
day school in which the subjects and activities prescribed by the State Council of Education are taught .... 2
Duties, indeed, do parents owe to the
1

On Christian Marriage, para. 16 (1930), FIVE

82 (1939).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §13-1327 (1950).
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state to educate their children for civic
responsibilities. The extent of these duties
we shall examine presently. But parents
have rights as well as duties and these
rights have been assured them by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Shortly after World War I the State of
Nebraska convicted a teacher in a Lutheran
parochial school of the crime of teaching
German to a ten-year-old boy. The avowed
purposes of the statute were to make
English the mother tongue of all children
reared in the State of Nebraska and to
teach them to think in English so that
they would not imbibe the foreign ideas
and sentiments of their parents.
Mr. Justice Holmes indicated a belief
that such legislation was a reasonable experiment in education and hence within
the police power of the state. But the majority of the Court disagreed vehemently
and held the legislation unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the
opinion of the Court, which read in part
as follows:
That the State may do much, go very far,
indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is
clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The
protection of the Constitution extends to all,

to those who speak other languages as well
as to those born with English on the tongue.
Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if
all had ready understanding of our ordinary
speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution - a
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should
provide: "That the wives of our guardians
are to be common, and their children are
to be common, and no parent is to know
his own child, nor any child his parent....
The proper officers will take the offspring of

4
the good parents to the pen or fold, and
there they will deposit them with certain
nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but
the offspring of the inferior, or of the better,
when they chance to be deformed, will be
put away in some mysterious, unknown
place, as they should be." In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven
into barracks and intrusted their subsequent
education and training to official guardians.
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their
ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from
those upon which our institutions rest; and
it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature
could impose such restrictions upon the
people of a State without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.3
Two years after the Nebraska case the
Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion
by Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice
Holmes this time concurring, struck down
a statute of the State of Oregon which
required parents to send their children to
public schools. 4 From a technical point of
view the case actually held that two educational corporations, the Society of Sisters,
and Hill Military Academy, were deprived
of the lawful use of their property by reason
of an improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by the statute upon
parents and guardians. But the Court said
specifically that the action of the state
against the parents of children who would
have attended the two schools was "arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful."
In the words of the Court:
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1923).
4 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
3

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1958

able relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State. The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 5

Right of the Church to Educate
On the parents, then, have God, the
Church, and civil society placed the primary duty and hence the primary right to
educate the child. Nevertheless the family
is an imperfect society and cannot provide
by itself all the means for its complete
development. However, the child, who
through the sacrament of Baptism receives
the divine life of grace, is born into a
second society, the Church, and to the
Church must parents turn for assistance in
those phases of education which pertain
to the child's eternal salvation, which provide him with a knowledge and a consequent love of and desire to serve God, his
final and ultimate End.
In the Catholic theology of education,
therefore, the Church plays an important
and essential role in the education of the
child but it is a supplementary role to the
extent that it assists or supplies the deficiencies of parents. In fact so jealous is the
Church
of the family's inviolable natural right to
educate the children, that she never consents, save under peculiar circumstances and
with special cautions, to baptize the children
of infidels or to provide for their education
against the will of parents, till such time as
5 Id. at 535.
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the children can choose for themselves and

This mission of education extends to
every branch of learning and every regulation insofar as religion and morality are
concerned. Nevertheless, the Church recognizes and upholds the right of the State
to supervise and promote the physical,
civic, and otherwise secular education of
its citizens.
It is the duty of the State to protect the
rights of the child to education whenever
its parents are found wanting either physically or morally in this respect, whether
by default, incapacity, or misconduct. In
such cases the State does not displace the
family but merely supplies deficiencies and
provides suitable means in confor'mity with
the rights of the child. In addiion, a concern for the common welfare demands that
the State require in its citizens a certain
degree of education without which the
proper operation of government is impossible. In some stages of civilization bare
literacy is a goal which can be achieved

only with difficulty. In more advanced
stages of industrial civilization such as our
own, much higher standards are necessary.
A democratic government must have
citizens with sufficient education to fulfill
their civic duties as voters, jurymen, officeholders; teachers, lawyers, doctors, judges,
legislators, administrators, ministers of religion are needed; commerce and industry
require engineers, architects, builders, barbers, clerks, stenographers, grocers and
manufacturers, plumbers and druggists, bus
drivers, sanitation experts, waiters, letter
carriers and mechanics - all are needed
and all must be educated.
But education for the professions, trades,
or other occupations, is not sufficient. In
addition to helping young persons to fulfill
the unique, particular functions in life
which it is in them to fulfill, the welfare
of the State demands that education fit
these youths for those common spheres
which, as citizens and heirs of a joint
culture, they will share with others.
The famous report of the Harvard Committee on General Education in a Free
Society distinguished these separate goals
and designated the first specialism and the
second general education. The goal of general education, in the language of the
Committee, is to provide ". . . the broad
critical sense by which to recognize competence in any field." 8 Knowledge must be
imparted but more important is the cultivation of certain aptitudes in the minds of
the young, namely: to think effectively, to
communicate thought, to make relevant
judgments, to discriminate among values. 9
Thus far the educational philosophy with
which we have dealt is Catholic. Much of

6 The ChristianEducation of Youth (1929), FIVE

8 REPORT OF THE HARVARD COMMITTEE, GENERAL

freely embrace the Faith. 6

True to her mandate to teach all nations
the Church places at the disposal of families, her office and facilities for education,
and, conversely, Catholic families eager to
profit by this offer entrust their children to
the Church in hundreds and thousands.
These two facts recall and proclaim a striking truth of the greatest significance in the
moral and social order. They declare that
the mission of education regards before all,
above all, primarily the Church and the
family, and this by natural and divine law,
canand that therefore it cannot be slighted,
7
not be evaded, cannot be supplanted.

Right of the State to Educate
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7 ld. at

48.

47-48 (1939).

EDUCATION IN A FREE SOCIETY

9 Id. at 64-65.

54 (1945).
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it adopts the language of canon law and of
the Papal encyclicals, and the rest is compatible with Catholic ideals. In many
nations, of course, ideas and ideals of
this kind are anathema to the State and
ruthlessly suppressed. In some countries
education is a state monopoly and the
Church is completely excluded from the
schools. Other nations go a step farther
and deny even to parents the right to a
voice in their children's education.
In a few countries the right of parents
to select the education for their children
is given effect by governmental aid. In still
other countries the State maintains and
supports a system of public education but
permits, though it does not support, schools
maintained by religious or private organizations.
Philosophy in Education
In each case, however, the educational
program adopted by a government is based
upon a philosophy. Make no mistake about
it. Philosophy cannot be separated from
education. The content, the materials, the
methods of a system of education will inevitably reflect the beliefs, conceptions,
principles, experience, attitudes, values in a word, broadly speaking, the philosophy of the educator. Just as governments
are founded upon the philosophies of
Hegel, or Marx and Engels, or John Locke,
or Jefferson and Madison, so are systems
of education based upon the philosophies
of Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Augustine,
Thomas Aquinas, Horace Mann, John
Dewey, William C. Bagley, or Herman H.
Home.10
At times a, particular philosophy is ele10

BROWN, EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FOUR
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(1956).
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vated to the rank of official state philosophy
and occasionally resembles a most dogmatic theology. Thus the philosophy of
Hegel begot Nazism and an extreme form
of Marxism has become the official philosophy of education as well as government
in Soviet Russia.
When the Founding Fathers of our own
beloved country met to draft the first ten
articles of the Bill of Rights, they were
faced with a very practical problem. Theirs
was the task to supplement the Constitution and to complete the foundation of a
sound system of government.
Their decisions were not based upon a
doctrinaire philosophy which sought to
transform radical theories into a plan of
government. For the most part, the artisans
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were lawyers seeking the common good
and anxious to assure public peace through
equal justice for conflicting groups.
No one can read the history of those
great debates without recognizing that
compromise was necessary at almost every
point. Not the compromise which sacrifices
principles to expediency, not the compromise which treads upon inalienable rights,
but the compromise which recognizes that
certain conflicting interests must be subordinated -to the common welfare and
which recognizes, moreover, that there are
certain areas in which government need
not and should not interfere.
Mindful of the sorrow and blood that
had engulfed England when Elizabeth and
Mary and Charles I and Oliver Cromwell
had successively attempted to dictate the
religion of the nation, the draftsmen of the
First Amendment provided that "congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ......
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Religion was still established in four of
the states but the very multiplicity of denominations throughout the colonies made
impractical an establishment of religion by
the federal government even if there had
been no fear such as Madison's that "...
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to
any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.
Development of Education
in America
Neither the Constitution nor the Bill of
Rights even mentioned the word "education." Under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress had evidenced its belief in the
need of a republic for popular education
by dedicating to public education great
blocks of land in the Northwest Territory.
Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson recommended the establishment of
a national university but formal schooling
at the end of the eighteenth century was
chiefly in the hands of religious bodies. As
early as 1642 Massachusetts had required
its towns to give elementary education to
children who were not taught at home.
Private schools were fairly common in
thickly populated districts and itinerant
teachers journeyed about whenever pupils
and fees were available. But religious
motives chiefly prompted the encouragement of education and religious sects sponsored and, to a great extent, controlled the
education of Americans from elementary
school through college.
11 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religions Assessments, as quoted by Mr. Justice
Rutledge, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
65-66 (1947) (dissenting opinion).

At first the growth of parochial schools
was fostered by many Protestant denominations as well as by Catholics. With a
few exceptions, notably the Missouri Synod
of the Lutheran Church, however, the
Protestant parochial school system failed.
The failure has been variously attributed
to a shortage of trained teachers, shortage
of money, lack of pupils, and a faltering
leadership in the face of liberalizing movements which drew adherents away from the
old orthodoxies. Moreover, the denominational publications began to take the position that the state school was not "godless"
but Protestant and, above all, American.
Protestant Americans were urged to see to
it that the common school remained Protestant by retaining the Protestant Bible.
The primary education controlled by the
State was Protestant. Why should they
expend labor and money to create other
Protestant schools under the control of
12
the Church?
"Consequently," says Father Francis X.
Curran, S.J., "American Protestantism surrendered the traditional claim of the Christian Church to control popular elemental
education into the hands of the only other
claimant, the state."13
Catholic Parochial Schools
Meanwhile Catholic parochial schools
were multiplying. At first Bishop Carroll
entertained the hope that Catholics might
unite with the non-Catholic fellow citizens
in building up a system of education that
would be mutually satisfactory from the
religious point of view. He soon realized
the futility of such a hope and in 1792,
soon after the First Catholic Synod, he
12 CURRAN,

THE

118-30 (1954).
13 Id. at 130.
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4
addressed a pastoral letter to the Catholics
of the country in which he emphasized the
necessity of a pious and Catholic education
of the young to insure their growing up in
4
the Faith.'
This admonition was repeated by the
First Council of Baltimore (1829) which
judged it absolutely necessary that schools
should be established, in which the young
may be taught the principles of faith and
morality, while being instructed in letters.
The Catholic parochial school system
prospered, though at the cost of unbelievable sacrifices. Thousands of men and
women dedicated their lives to Catholic
education in the religious orders and
congregations; devoted laymen in lesser
numbers, but frequently with comparable
sacrifices, joined the ranks of the teachers;
families with marginal incomes built schools
and met the inadequate but still burdensome salary bills; colleges and universities
established courses of teacher training;
the bishops and diocesan school officials
organized and supervised the educational
system and elevated standards to meet the
accreditation demands of state departments
of education.
By 1900 over five per cent of the primary and secondary school children were
enrolled in parochial schools. Fifty-seven
years later the percentage had increased to
twelve per cent and the percentage of
elementary school children in parochial
schools had risen to almost thirteen per
cent. Thus it seems that today almost sixty
per cent of the Catholic children of elementary school age in America are in
Catholic schools. 15
14 THE NATIONAL PASTORALS OF THE AMERICAN

2-15 (Guilday ed. 1954).
15 Sullivan, The Growth of Catholic Schools, 98
AMERICA 201-05 (1957).
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The contribution which Catholic schools
have made to the educational progress of
America is incalculable. The expenditure
in dollars is only a small portion of the
total cost since it does not include the
services donated in whole or in part by
over 100,000 religious and more than
20,000 lay teachers. And who can evaluate
the contribution which has been made by
the graduates of parochial schools in the
ranks of the professions, commerce, trade,
industry, government, education, religion!
Who can measure the effect upon our civic
and public life of the millions of Godfearing men and women whom parochial
schools have educated in morality and good
citizenship based upon sound, forceful
religious convictions!
Difficulties of Parochial Schools
One might expect America to welcome
such assistance; to remove obstacles from
its path; to offer financial as well as moral
support. Indeed, in the early part of the
nineteenth century some Catholic schools
did receive public aid. In 1830, Lowell,
Massachusetts appropriated fifty dollars
toward the establishment of a parochial
school. In New York City one Catholic
school received state aid for a time, but
New York soon withdrew its aid in 1825
because of the activity of the Public School
Society.
Despite its name, the Public (originally
the Free) School Society was a private
organization incorporated for the purpose
of establishing free non-denominational
religious schools. Under the Laws of New
York, 1813, chap. 52, the State legislature
appropriated exclusively for teachers' salaries $50,000 to be distributed to the "Free
School Society ...and such incorporated
religious societies as now support or here-
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after shall establish charity schools within
the city. . ....
Restriction of State Aid to

Religious Schools in New York
In 1817 the Free School Society obtained an extension of the purposes for
which the public funds might be used and
in 1822 the Bethel Baptist Church sought
and received a similar privilege. Fearful
that denominational schools might draw
away pupils from its schools, the Free
School Society then sought and obtained
legislation depriving all religious schools of
a share in the school fund.' 6
For all intents and purposes public education was now in the hands of a private
religious, though professedly non-sectarian,
organization. The Catholics continued to
protest against the use in the free schools
of a Protestant version of the Bible and
even greater outcries were raised, though in
vain, against anti-Catholic passages in the
assigned textbooks.
Seeing the futility of attempts to influence the policies of the so-called Public
School Society, and equally mindful of the
dangers to faith and morals of a school
entirely devoid of religion, Catholics set to
work to build up a parochial school system
entirely independent of the State.
From time to time an abortive effort was
made to obtain public assistance, but the
Catholic claims received little support from
non-Catholics and, by the middle of the
century, as we have seen, non-Catholic
religious groups had all but abandoned
their efforts to organize a parochial school
system.
Finally, in 1894, New York State adopted
16 CONNORS,

CHURCH-STATE

RELATIONSHIPS

IN

EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK XV-XViii

(1951).

an amendment to its constitution by adding
a new section 4 to article IX:
Neither the state nor any subdivision
thereof shall use its property or credit or
any public money, or authorize or permit
either to be used, directly or indirectly, in
aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under
the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational
tenet or doctrine is taught .... 17
In other places, specifically Florissant,
Missouri, and Conewago, Pennsylvania,
parochial schools limited their instruction
during official school hours to secular subjects and taught religion at other times. In
return they received public funds for the
secular instruction imparted. As late as
1889 there were similar instances in Connecticut, Georgia and New Jersey.' s
The most famous compromise, however,
was the Poughkeepsie (New York) Plan.
For nearly twenty years the City Board of
Education, composed entirely of Protestants, leased St. Peter's School building at
an annual rent of one dollar. The school
was open to all denominations and no religious exercises were held during official
school hours. Teachers were selected, employed, paid and subject to dismissal by
the board, and both teachers and pupils
were subject during school hours to the
control and authority of the board.
In practice the board accepted the pastor's nomination of Sisters of Charity and
other Catholics as teachers and permitted
him to reject schoolbooks which he might
consider harmful to the faith or morals of
the children.
N. Y. CONST. art. IX, §4 (1894). This provision
has been renumbered and may be found in the
current New York constitution, N. Y. CONST.
art. 11, §4.
18 CONNORS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 109-J0.
17
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Many Protestants and Jews enthusiastically supported the plan and some of them
sent their own children to the school without ever finding reason to complain of
unfair treatment. Nevertheless, by 1898,
the Poughkeepsie Plan had been declared
illegal by decisions of school superintendents on the ground that the wearing of
religious garb by the Sisters contributed a
sectarian influence and that the Sisters'
withdrawal from the world at large made
them completely unfit to be public school
teachers.' 9
In any event, these decisions were ultimately affirmed by the court under the
amendment to the New York State consti20
tution of which we have already spoken.

ance of the children were printed on public
22
school presses during school hours.
Finally in 1938 New York restrained

This amendment was explicit in its prohibition of the use of property, credit, or public
money of the State, directly or indirectly,
in and of any school under the direction of
any religious denomination.

portation of pupils induces attendance at

Restriction on State Aid
to Children in New York
Accordingly, in 1922, New York held
that the free distribution, by the City of
Ogdensburg, of text books for the use of
children attending parochial schools of the

Roman Catholic Church was an indirect
aid to the schools and hence violative of
21
the State constitution.
Similarly in 1925 New York held a released time program to be unconstitutional
since the cards used to check the attend10 See decisions No. 4516, 1896, Durant v. West

Troy Dist., No. 4546, 1897, Kennedy v. Watervliet Dist., No. 4642, 1898, Lockwood v. Corning
Dist., No. 4722, 1898, Keyser v. Poughkeepsie
Dist.
20 See O'Connor v. Hendrick, 109 App. Div. 361,
96 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1905), aff'd 184 N. Y. 421,
77 N.E. 612 (1906).
21 Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195
N.Y. Supp. 715 (3d Dep't 1922).

the Board of Education of the Town of
Hempstead from using public funds to
furnish transportation for pupils to and
from any parochial school pursuant to

Section 206 (18) of the New York Education Law.28 But this time the court was

divided four to three. The majority held
that aid furnished indirectly
• . . clearly embraces any contribution, to

whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally,
disguised, or otherwise not in a straight,
open and direct course for the open and
avowed aid of the school, that may be to
the benefit of the institution or promotional
of its interests and purposes ....
school. .

.

no school.

Free trans-

. Without pupils there could be

24

On the other hand the minority opinion
maintained that having made attendance at
school compulsory and having approved
attendance at parochial schools, the action
of the legislature in providing transportation to insure attendance and to safeguard
the health of the children was in aid of the
children and not in aid of the school.
Public opinion supported the minority
opinion and in due course the Constitution
was amended so as to permit the use of
public funds to transport children to and
25
from denominational schools.
New Jersey School Bus Case
But soon a new threat to incidental state
aid for Catholic children developed in
Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N. Y. Supp.
822 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
22
23

Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15

N.E.2d 576 (1938).
24 id.
25

at 212, 15 N.E.2d at 582.

N. Y. CONST. art. 11, §4.
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Ewing, New Jersey. In order to understand
the Everson case,2 6 or the New Jersey
School Bus Case as it is sometimes called, a
bit of constitutional history is necessary.
We have already seen that the First
Amendment provided that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. In 1866 the Federal Constitution
was again altered by the Fourteenth
Amendment which reads in part as follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law; . . .27
But it was not until 1925, in the case of
Gitlow v. New York, 28 that the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment was
now applicable to the states.
The principle of law enunciated in this
decision was startling. If appealed to in
1894 it might have invalidated the Poughkeepsie Plan even before the New York
State constitution was amended. But the
principle was now the basis of an attack
on a statute already upheld by the New
Jersey courts which had permitted the
Board of Education of the Township of
Ewing to recompense parents for bus fare
expended by their children in traveling to
and from a religious school.
The Supreme Court upheld the legislation in spite of attacks based on the due
process clause and the establishment of a
religion. But the decision was not a victory
for religious education. The Court had
divided five to four and the minority had
written two vigorous dissents. But even the

majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black contained language which foreshadowed difficulties to come.
"Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church," 29 said Mr. Justice Black. "Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer
-.0 "The
one religion over another.
First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state." 3' 1
Although the Court had declined to base
its decision in the Oregon School Case on a
metaphor which called the public school
"a melting pot," the language of the School
Bus Case thus appeared to establish, as a
principle of constitutional law, an equally
82
rhetorical and inaccurate metaphor.
The McCollum Case
The dangers inherent in the Court's reliance upon a metaphor in the School Bus
Case were soon realized.
The Champaign, Illinois, Board of Education had established a program of religious instruction in public schools for
children whose parents had given written
consent. Classes for separate religious
groups were taught once a week for less
than an hour in the public school classroom by Protestant teachers, Catholic
priests and a Jewish rabbi. Attendance
reports of children participating in the program of religious instruction were prepared
by the public school teachers while children
not so participating were sent elsewhere in
the building to pursue their secular studies.
But a Mrs. Vashti McCollum, whose
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
30 Ibid.
29

26

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U. S. 1 (1947).

31 Id. at 18.

27

U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.

32 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

28

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).

(1925).
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child was enrolled in the Champaign public school, attacked the plan in the courts
of llinois. Failing to convince the state
courts, she appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. This time she succeeded and the Court held, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Black, that the Champaign
arrangement was in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of Church
and State, as expressed in the First Amendment and made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly that the state courts below had acted
erroneously in refusing relief to the complainant, parent and taxpayer, against the
continued use of school buildings for such
33
religious instruction.
This conclusion was supported further
in a separate concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter,8 4 in which the historical backgrounds of the principle of separation of Church and State, and of "released
time" arrangements, are considered at
length.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in an additional
opinion,3 5 although concurring in the result, expressed doubt as to the standing of
the complainant to raise the question at
issue and also felt that the relief granted,
prohibiting all religious instruction in the
schools, was too broad and indefinite.
Mr. Justice Reed dissented36 on the
ground that the cooperative "released time"
arrangement did not involve either an
"establishment of religion" or "aid" to religion by the State sufficient to justify the
Supreme Court in interfering with local
legislation and customs.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
210 (1948).
34 Id. at 212 (concurring opinion).
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Id. at 232 (concurring opinion).
I'd, at 238 (dissenting opinion).
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Rarely in the history of the Supreme
Court has an opinion been subjected to
such severe scrutiny, such lavish praise,
such unmitigated condemnation. Enemies
of religion, educationists who sought to
widen their grasp and influence on American education welcomed the decision in
extravagant terms. Proponents of "released
time" programs expressed disagreement
and disappointment. But the most devastating attack came from one of the country's most respected scholars in the field of
constitutional law, Professor Edward S.
Corwin, a non-Catholic, interested in the
constitutional questions involved rather
than the religious and educational overtones.
Professor Corwin cited six senior arguments against the decision in the McCollum
case. Most forceful, however, were these:
[..
[T]he decision is seen to stem from an
unhistorical conception of what is meant by
"an establishment of religion" in the First
Amendment. The historical record shows
beyond peradventure that the core idea of
"an establishment of religion" comprises the
idea of preference; and that any act of public authority favorable to religion in general
cannot, without manifest falsification of history, be brought under the ban of that
phrase. Undoubtedly the Court has the right
to make history, as it has often done in the
past; but it has no right to remake it.
Finally, this question may be asked: Is
the decision favorable to democracy? Primarily democracy is a system of ethical
values, and that this system of values so far
as the American people are concerned is
grounded in religion will not be denied by
anybody who knows the historical record.
And that the agencies by which this system
of values has been transmitted in the past
from generation to generation - the family,
the neighborhood, the church - have today
become much impaired will not be seriously
questioned by anybody who knows anything
about contemporary conditions. But what
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this all adds up to is that the work of transmission has been put more and more upon
the shoulders of the public schools. Can
they, then, do the job without the assistance
of religious instruction? At least, there seems
to be a widely held opinion to the contrary. 37

figured so strongly in the School Bus
Case, 4 1 the opinion said in part:

The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather,
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches
could not be required to pay even property
taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted
to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would
violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in
the messages of the Chief Executive; the
proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a
holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths - these and all other references
to the Almighty that run through our laws,
our public rituals, our ceremonies would be
flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious
atheist or agnostic could even object to the
supplication with which the Court opens
each session: "God save the United States
and this Honorable Court."

The Zorach Case
Once before, the Supreme Court, in the
case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 8 had restricted religious liberty in a
case involving the public schools by upholding the suspension of a child, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, who had
refused to salute the flag of the United
States on the ground that such a salute is
forbidden by a command of Scripture.
Upon sober second thought the Court overruled itself in a similar case, Board of
Education v. Barnette,39 only Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who had written the Gobitis
opinion, dissenting.
Consequently, when the New York "released time" program came before the
United States Supreme Court, in the case
of Zorach v. Clauson,40 its sponsors hoped
for a more sympathetic reception than had
been tendered the Illinois plan. Justices
Black, Frankfurter and Jackson could see
no significant difference between the systems and said so in vigorous dissents. The
majority of the Court, however, speaking
through Mr. Justice Douglas, distinguished
the cases on the ground that the New York
system did not involve religious instruction
in public schools or the expenditure of
public funds.
Evidently referring to the "wall of separation between church and state" which
Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 20-21
(1949).
38310 U.S. 586 (1940).
39 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
40 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
37

...

We are a religious people whose insti-

tutions presuppose a Supreme Being...
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the
42
public service to their spiritual needs.
And so we begin to discover a hopeful,
optimistic note. Under God this nation has
gone far towards establishing a modus
vivendi among the divergent groups of our
pluralist society.
Parents are free to supervise the edu(Continued on page 251)
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
Zorach v. Clauson; 343 U.S. 306, 312-14
(1952).
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